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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper presents the first estimates of Spanish infrastructure stock and 
investment for the period 1845-1935. Several sources and techniques have been 
used in the estimation, and the new series are reasonably reliable to the standards 
of historical statistics. Two distinct periods may be distinguished in the series: the 
years before 1895 (characterized by the prominence of railroads) and the period 
1895-1935 (when most investment was addressed to other assets). The new series 
allow a preliminary comparison of the Spanish infrastructure endowment with 
that of the most advanced countries, showing a gradual process of convergence 
before 1936.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
By the end of 1843, after half a century of successive wars and constant political turmoil 
and fiscal crisis, the Spanish infrastructure stock was meager and in very bad condition. It barely 
consisted of a network of paths that were unevenly distributed across the country. Of these paths 
only a small part was adapted to cart traffic, and an even smaller proportion actually deserved to 
be called roads. In addition, some small-scale ports and a few dams, canals and irrigation ditches 
completed the country’s infrastructure endowment. Many of those structures were several 
centuries old by 1843, and some of them had their origin in former Roman works.1 
Between the mid-1840’s and Franco’s coup d’État of 18th July 1936, the scenery was 
completely altered. The old paths gradually disappeared under the surface of a real network of 
macadam roads, which, by the eve of the Civil War of 1936-1939, connected most population 
centers of the country and had started to be covered with the so-called “special” surface 
treatment. At the same time, the railroads, which would perform the principal role in the Spanish 
transport revolution, spread all over the territory. Finally, the most important ports were endowed 
with complex and large-scale structures, the number of dams and irrigation canals increased 
substantially, and cities were equipped with modern networks of lighting, water distribution and 
sewage systems. 
Over ninety years, infrastructure had changed the face of the country and had become one 
of the most visible aspects of Spanish modernization. In fact, it constituted one of the factors that 
made economic growth possible. The slow but continuous rise of income per capita in Spain 
between the mid-nineteenth century and 1936 would have been stopped, or been constrained to 
some coastal areas, without the spectacular reduction in transport, communication and energy 
costs, brought about by the new infrastructure. 
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As economists have long insisted, this sort of cost reduction, its dynamic long-term 
consequences and, specifically, the changes in the structure of location incentives that it 
produces, are absolutely crucial for growth. Thanks to the increase in infrastructure endowments, 
economies are allowed to exploit fixed resources that would otherwise remain idle due to the 
high transport costs. In addition, infrastructure allows a large share of non-agrarian production 
activities to concentrate in a few industrial centers, in a process that is absolutely crucial for the 
growth of developing economies and the rise of technologically advanced sectors.2 
It is not surprising therefore, that infrastructure has always received the attention of 
economic historians and, more concretely, has always been included among the factors that may 
explain the evolution of the Spanish economy between 1850 and 1936. During those years, Spain 
experienced a sustained process of growth, but was unable to converge with the most 
industrialized European economies,3 and researchers have attempted to find out to what extent 
the shortage or inefficiency of infrastructure was one of the factors to blame for that relative 
failure. 
Research on the role of infrastructure in Spanish economic growth before the Civil War of 
1936-1939 has been characterized by two features. On the one hand, as is usual in international 
historiography, analyses on the subject have focused on the railroad system. On the other hand, 
opinions on the role that railroads performed in Spanish economic growth have been divergent, 
provoking an intense debate that still remains unresolved. Some historians have indicated that the 
State’s mistakes in the regulation of railroad construction and operation prevented an intensive 
use of the railroad network and, as a consequence, substantially reduced the economic impact of 
the railroad system.4 By contrast, other researchers have insisted that railroads had an enormous 
growth impact in Spain, which was in fact much higher than in other European economies due, 
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amongst other reasons, to the lack of opportunities for the development of inland waterways in 
the country.5 
After those initial interpretations, research devoted to the analysis of different aspects of 
the railroad system has been abundant.6 In addition, during the last few years, some studies on 
other parts of Spain’s infrastructure have been published.7 However, in spite of these recent 
research efforts, an aggregate and systematic approach to the whole Spanish infrastructure stock 
is still missing. Such an approach would allow a better knowledge of some essential aspects of 
the history of Spanish infrastructure, such as the distribution of investment efforts amongst 
different assets, the importance of infrastructure capital formation within the whole economy, or 
the relative degree of infrastructure shortage in Spain compared with other countries. In addition, 
it would provide a quantitative basis for the solution of the old debate on the economic impact of 
Spanish infrastructure. 
These pages are aimed precisely at filling that gap, by providing an estimation of Spanish 
infrastructure investment and stock between 1845 and 1935. The text is organized in four parts. 
The next section offers a brief account of the methods that have been followed for the 
construction of the new series. Section III presents the main results of the estimation, and 
performs some sensitivity analyses. Finally, on the basis of the new figures, Section IV describes 
the main features of Spanish infrastructure investment and stock during the period under study. It 
is followed by a summary of the main conclusions, and an Appendix containing the complete 
series and the main sources that have been used to obtain them. 
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II. THE NEW SERIES OF SPANISH INFRASTRUCTURE STOCK AND 
INVESTMENT: ESTIMATION METHOD 
Infrastructure is quite a tricky concept, since most people know what it is, but it is difficult 
to find a widely accepted definition in the literature.8 From a very broad point of view, 
infrastructure might be described as the stock of structures and support services that are 
necessary for the economic development of an area. This preliminary definition, however, admits 
many possible interpretations, from very narrow views of the concept, such as Hirschman’s (who 
limited the hard core of infrastructure to transport and energy distribution), to very wide 
perspectives, such as those which include within the concept, the so-called “civic” infrastructure, 
i.e. “the way in which business is done”.9 
Most empirical studies, however, tend to fall somewhere between these two extreme 
interpretations, and consider infrastructure as the stock of physical capital goods that are 
organized in networks and fixed to the territory, and provide services which show some of the 
typical features of public goods. In Diewert’s words, infrastructure services are similar to public 
goods as far as: “(i) there is a substantial cost of providing the service to an area and a small 
marginal cost of adding an extra customer to the area service grid (...) and (ii) charging 
customers the marginal cost of providing the service once the area service has been established 
will not lead to an efficient allocation of resources”.10 
These features explain why Public Sector intervention is so frequent in infrastructure 
construction and management. However, infrastructure services are not pure public goods, as far 
as they use to be congestible and excludable to some extent.11 
Infrastructure is usually divided into economic infrastructure (i.e. those assets that provide 
direct services to production, such as transport, communication or energy distribution networks), 
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and social infrastructure (i.e. those assets that enhance social welfare, such as education and 
health structures).12 This is not a strict division, because some elements, such as universities, 
perform both economic and social functions. However, it is a useful distinction because the 
impact of each of those two categories on productivity is very different. Several empirical studies 
have shown that economic infrastructure is much more conducive to direct efficiency increases 
than social infrastructure.13 
The differences between economic and social infrastructure make a separate study of each 
of those two categories advisable. In this context, this research  focuses on economic 
infrastructure due, amongst other reasons, to the slow development of Spanish social 
infrastructure during the period under analysis, and also due to the fact that most information 
about its historical evolution is only available at a local level, and thus beyond the possibilities of 
an individual researcher. Accordingly, the assets that are considered here are the following: 
• transport infrastructure (roads, railroads, urban transport, canals 
and ports). 
• communication infrastructure (telegraph and telephone networks). 
• energy distribution networks (gas and electricity). 
• water infrastructure (dams and irrigation canals). 
• urban and suburban infrastructure. 
Within these sectors, only the assets that are usually considered as infrastructure are 
covered by the research. Therefore, the estimates do not measure the value of the total capital 
stock of sectors such as transport or electricity, but include only those elements that can be 
considered as infrastructure strictu sensu, i.e. which are fixed to the territory and have certain 
public character. For instance, within transport, railroad rolling stock, merchant ships or 
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motorcars are not encompassed by the series, since they are not fixed to the territory. Similarly, 
the value of land has also been excluded from the estimation, because it does not belong in the 
capital stock. 
The starting point of the estimation is 1844. This was determined by the availability of 
information. In fact, a more comprehensive analysis of the Spanish industrialization process 
would have required starting the research fifteen or twenty years earlier. However, the available 
data on investment in infrastructure before 1844 is too scarce to allow the estimation of yearly 
series. 
The estimates are net capital stock figures, which are intended to reflect the productive 
capacity of each asset, as well as its gradual decay over time. Several procedures are available to 
estimate net capital stock figures. Obviously, the optimal method is the direct measurement of 
the replacement cost of the stock in a series of benchmark years. However, the amount of 
information required to apply this estimation technique is enormous, making its use difficult 
even when analyzing economies today,  and virtually impossible in historical research. 
As a second best choice, most researchers use the perpetual inventory method, according to 
which the stock is estimated through the accumulation of investment   flows over time, after 
establishing a number of assumptions about the pattern of survival and efficiency decay of the 
assets. Accordingly, the net capital stock at time t is estimated as: 
Kt = φ 0 It + φ 1 It-1 + … + φ T It-T     (1), 
where I is the level of gross fixed capital formation in each year, the series of coefficients φ 
reflects the efficiency decay of capital over time, and T is the useful life of capital. In order to 
apply expression (1), it is necessary, therefore, to obtain sufficiently long gross investment 
series, and to make likely assumptions about the useful life and the efficiency decay of each 
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asset. The next few paragraphs describe the way in which these two aspects have been dealt with 
in this research. 
a. The gross investment series 
As far as investment data is concerned, most estimates of infrastructure stock for current 
economies are based on the use of public gross capital formation as a proxy for gross investment 
in infrastructure. This approach does not provide exact figures, because public investment 
includes some assets that do not belong in infrastructure and, at the same time, excludes a certain 
proportion of infrastructure because it is privately owned. However, the biases associated with 
these two problems are usually not very serious for recent times, and the use of public capital 
figures as representative of infrastructure is, to some extent, justified by the ease of their 
estimation.14 For instance, in the case of Spain, the evolution of the infrastructure stock from 
1955 onwards has been recently estimated by the Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones 
Económicas (IVIE) on the basis of public investment data.15 
With the objective of carrying the analysis back in time, the IVIE has also produced figures 
of the State’s net capital stock for the years 1900-1990.16 However, in the Spanish case, the use 
of public capital figures as representative for infrastructure is not appropriate for the pre-1936 
period because a large number of assets, such as railroads, tramways, the telephone system, 
energy distribution networks and some hydraulic works (i.e., more than 50 per cent of the stock 
of infrastructure) were privately owned at the time. As a consequence, the estimation of 
infrastructure series for the period before 1936 needs to complement the available information 
about the State’s capital stock with data on private infrastructure investment. In fact, this task has 
been recently initiated by the IVIE itself, with an estimation of the stock of Spanish railroad 
infrastructure since 1844.17 
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Unlike this sectoral approach, in this research I have adopted a wider perspective and 
present estimates for all (public and private) Spanish infrastructure during the period 1844-1935. 
Therefore, in order to carry out the estimation, I had to retrieve investment data for each type of 
infrastructure, regardless of its public or private character. To that purpose, I followed different 
procedures. In a few cases (broad gauge railroads, State roads and ports), I was able to find some  
information on the amounts that were invested each year, and had only to make some statistical 
or accounting adjustments. By contrast, for other types of infrastructure, I had to estimate the 
value of the “gross” capital stock (i.e., without accounting for the efficiency decay of the assets) 
in one or several benchmark years, on the basis of the available technical and accounting 
information, and had to use physical indicators of the evolution of the stock to transform the 
benchmark estimates into yearly series of gross stock. These were then first-differenced in order 
to get “new” yearly investment figures, i.e. data on the annual excess investment after replacing 
the assets that were retired each year. Each series of “new” investment was then added to a 
hypothetical series of replacement investment, which was estimated according to the 
assumptions on the useful life of each asset. Finally, I took the sum of “new” and replacement 
investment as a gross investment series for each type of infrastructure.18 
All investment series are presented in Table A1 of the Appendix.19 Figures always refer to 
the end of the year and are expressed in constant pesetas of the mid-point year of the period 
under analysis (1890). The price index that has been used to deflate the available investment 
series (in the cases of broad gauge railroads, State’s roads and ports), or to express in 1890 
pesetas the stock and investment indices estimated on the basis of physical indicators (in all other 
cases) is the deflator for “Other construction” investment, which has recently been estimated by 
Leandro Prados de la Escosura.20 
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b. Assumptions on the useful life and efficiency decay of infrastructure 
In the context of capital stock estimates, the absence of adequate information often makes it 
necessary to establish assumptions on the useful life and the efficiency decay patterns of the 
assets. These assumptions use to be too simple, especially when compared with the complexity 
of the technological and structural changes of the economic system which have a direct influence 
on the process of effective capital destruction.21 As a consequence, assumptions on these two 
issues tend to introduce biases in the final series that are very difficult to make up for, especially 
in a historical estimation exercise for which data is much scarcer than for present times. In this 
research I tried to choose those assumptions that seemed most likely, on the basis of the available 
information, but in the next section I make an approach to the potential size of the biases 
associated   with these aspects, by analyzing the sensitivity of the estimates to the establishment 
of different assumptions. 
The useful life figures that I finally adopted in the estimation are shown in Table 1, and are 
similar to those applied in other estimations of capital stock for the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. In a few cases (narrow gauge railroads and tramways) I was able to get 
information on assets that were retired before the end of their useful life due to their 
obsolescence or lack of profitability, and I subtracted their value from the net stock at the time of 
their retirement, and not at the end of their useful life. 
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Table 1. Useful life assumptions 
Assets Years of 
useful life 
Railroads:  
Grading, works and stations 100 
Track and accessories 18/30* 
Tramways 25 
Roads 80 
Ports 80 
Telegraph and Telephone 30 
Energy distribution networks 25 
Urban infrastructure 25 
Hydraulic works 80 
Note: (*) Change in 1872. 
Sources: Feinstein (1988), Groote (1996) and, for railroad track, Gómez Mendoza (1982) and (1989a). 
 
Assuming the useful life figures in Table 1 made it necessary to exclude the oldest 
infrastructure from the estimation, i.e. those tracks that were in use before the construction of the 
road network, and a number of dams, canals and irrigation ditches that had been build before the 
eighteenth century. By 1844, all of them had long reached the end of their useful life, and their 
valuation in net terms at the end of that year would have required information of their state of 
repair. According to some contemporary indications, they seem to have been in a very precarious 
condition, especially in the case of tracks.22 As a consequence, they would have amounted to a 
very tiny share of the total stock in 1844, and this would have gradually become negligible with 
the construction of new assets. This is shown in more detail in the next section, which includes 
an analysis of the sensitivity of the estimates to the exclusion of the oldest infrastructure. 
As far as the efficiency decay of the assets is concerned, the most usual patterns in the 
literature are the one-hoss shay, the straight-line and the geometric decay. According to the first 
one, assets would maintain full efficiency until their retirement. In other words, it would be 
assumed that φ 0 = φ 1 = … = φ T-1 = 1, and φ T =0 in expression (1). The straight-line pattern 
involves an identical loss of efficiency during the whole useful life of assets, i.e. it is assumed 
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that φ 0 = 1, φ 1 = 1-1/T, φ 2 = 1-2/T,  …, φ T-1 = 1-(T-1)/T, and φ T =0. Finally, the geometric 
decay pattern assumes that the productive capacity of assets decreases at a constant rate δ or, in 
other words, that (φt-1 - φ t)/φ t-1 = δ for all t<T. 
The geometric decay pattern has received more empirical support than the rest, the 
depreciation rate usually being calculated as δ=2/T. On the basis of a detailed econometric 
analysis of second-hand asset prices, Hulten and Wykoff have suggested a modification of this 
expression for different types of capital. In the case of non-residential structures, they have 
estimated a depreciation rate of 0.91/T, which has been used here to obtain the infrastructure 
stock series.23 
The final figures of net stock for each type of infrastructure are presented in Table A2 of 
the Appendix. As in the case of investment, figures always refer to the end of the year and are 
expressed in constant pesetas of the mid-point year of the period under analysis (1890). 
 
III. ESTIMATION OUTCOMES AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Figures 1 and 2 show Spanish infrastructure gross investment and net stock series during 
the period 1844-1935. In order to provide a more complete image of the historical process of 
Spanish infrastructure construction, they also include the IVIE estimates for the years 1955-
1994.24 
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Fig. 1. Spanish Gross Infrastructure Investment (1845-1994).
1
10
100
1000
10000
18
45
18
55
18
65
18
75
18
85
18
95
19
05
19
15
19
25
19
35
19
45
19
55
19
65
19
75
19
85
Sources : for 1845-1935, my own figures; for 1955-1994, Mas et al. (1998).
M
ill
io
n 
of
 1
89
0 
pe
se
ta
s
 
 14
Fig. 2.  Spanish Net Infrastructure Stock (1844-1994).
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Despite the gap of the Civil War and the post-war, and the coverage differences between 
figures for the period before 1936 and after 1954, the graphs offer a consistent picture of the 
evolution of Spanish infrastructure from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. They clearly show 
the four periods of maximum growth of the stock, i.e. the railroad mania of the last years of 
Queen Isabel II’s reign (1855-1866), the 1920s, the end of the Francoist dictatorship (late 1960s 
and early 1970s) and the period 1986-1992.25 Between those conjunctures, a series of stagnation 
periods appear in the graphs that correspond to the depression of the late nineteenth century, the 
Civil War and the beginning of the Francoist rule, and the crisis of 1973. 
Despite the likelihood of the global trends, the accuracy of the new estimates is only 
relative, as is usual with historical statistics, and, although the overall process of Spanish 
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infrastructure construction seems to be adequately described by the series, inferences drawn from 
minor details or from short-term variations must be taken with extreme caution. The series have 
been estimated on the basis of limited information, and it has been necessary to establish a 
number of assumptions to make up for the lack of data. This may have introduced several biases 
in the final figures, which may be assumed to be larger at the beginning of the period than at the 
end of it, in the partial series than in the aggregate, and in the short term rather than in the long 
term. 
The potential biases may have different origins. Firstly, some assets have been excluded 
from the series due to the absence of information. For instance, it has not been possible to 
include airport infrastructure in the estimates due to the lack of adequate investment data, 
although this exclusion seems to be of minor importance in the period before 1936.26 As has already 
been indicated, the assets that were constructed before the eighteenth century have also been 
excluded from the series, due to the lack of information on their construction costs and state of 
repair by 1844. As far as they  were still being used at that time, the stock estimates of the first 
decades would contain a downward bias. In order to approach the maximum size of that bias, I have 
made an optimistic valuation of those assets, by assuming for them similar construction costs to 
those of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, and a ratio between net and gross stock of 50 percent 
by 1844. Under these assumptions, ancient infrastructure would amount to 9 percent of the stock in 
1844, and just 1 percent twenty years later. 
A second source of potential bias is the poor quality of the empirical information that has been 
used to estimate some of the sectoral series. The most serious problems arise in the case of urban 
infrastructure, for which I have been unable to obtain reliable systematic data, and I merely suggest 
a correction of the aggregate figures on the basis of very insufficient evidence. But empirical 
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information is also scarce and of very poor quality in other sectors, such as non-public railroads, 
local roads, the telegraph network, gas distribution infrastructure and canals. Unlike the rest of the 
series, which are based on reliable data on the invested resources and the physical characteristics of 
the stock, information regarding  these five sectors is indirect and incomplete, and estimates are a 
mere proxy of the actual figures and will contain a relatively high margin of error. Nonetheless, the 
importance of these assets within the whole infrastructure is rather small, as they only amounted to 
approximately 6 percent of the total stock, and 8 percent of the total investment during the period 
under study. 
By contrast, for all other infrastructure the available information is acceptable, according to 
the usual standards of historical statistics, and the most important potential biases would be 
associated to the assumptions that have been applied to carry out the estimation process. Potential 
biases of this kind may be classified in three categories: i) those that result from the deflation 
procedure, ii) those that are a consequence of the individual assumptions that are applied in the 
estimation of sectoral series, and iii) those that are associated with the general assumptions that were 
established in the application of the perpetual inventory method. 
Regarding the first of these three potential sources of bias, the use of an average deflator that 
is the same for all series removes the “index number problem” associated with the combination of 
several sectoral series into an aggregate one.27 However, as single price indices for each type of 
infrastructure are missing, the mismatch between the average deflator and the evolution of the price 
of each individual asset may have introduced biases into the final figures of unknown magnitude 
and sign. In fact, as far as the deflator that has been used is an average, biases may be assumed to 
cancel each other in the aggregate series. However, they may have reduced the accuracy of the 
individual estimates. 
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The second category of problems is associated with the assumptions that have been applied to 
estimate each individual series. For example, in those cases in which no investment data was 
available, physical indicators have been accepted as proxies for the evolution of the gross stock and, 
as a consequence, the potential increases in the technical complexity of the assets or in the quality 
of materials that were used in its construction may have introduced downward biases in the 
growth rate of the series. By contrast, upward biases may result from increases in the 
productivity of construction of each network, and can also arise as a consequence of the poor 
conservation of the assets. Although changes in quality and in the technical characteristics of 
infrastructure have been allowed for as far as possible, sometimes the lack of information has 
prevented adjustments, and some individual series may contain biases of unknown sign and 
magnitude. Nevertheless, as in the case of the deflation process, although those biases may be 
important for the sectoral series, they are probably much less relevant in the aggregate figures. 
Finally, it is also necessary to analyze the consequences of the basic assumptions 
associated to the application of the perpetual inventory method and, more concretely, those 
regarding the useful lives and the efficiency decay of the assets. As far as the first of these two 
aspects is concerned, I have tried to keep the same useful lives as in other historical analyses of 
infrastructure. However, the accuracy of this choice is uncertain, since there is a total lack of 
information about the retirement and renewal practices that were followed at the time. In order to 
illustrate the size of the potential biases that would be associated with this problem, Figure 3 
shows the difference between my infrastructure stock series and the estimates that would result 
from applying a homogeneous useful life of 50 years for all assets. This useful life figure has 
often been assumed for buildings and structures in capital stock estimates.28 The gap between 
both series is rather small, amounting, on average, to 3 percent in 1844-1890 and to 12 percent in 
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1890-1935. Accordingly, the influence of the useful life assumption on the final series seems to 
be rather low, something that may be explained by the fact that estimates in Figure 3 are not 
based on the pure application of the perpetual inventory method to investment series, but on the 
combination of investment data with physical indicators of the evolution of the stock. 
Fig. 3.  The Spanish infrastructure stock: alternative estimates under different 
assumptions on the useful life of the assets
100
1000
10000
18
44
18
49
18
54
18
59
18
64
18
69
18
74
18
79
18
84
18
89
18
94
18
99
19
04
19
09
19
14
19
19
19
24
19
29
19
34
Sources : my own figures.
M
ill
io
n 
of
 1
89
0 
pe
se
ta
s
Useful lives of Table 1
Useful life of 50 years
 
Figure 4 compares the infrastructure stock series that has been estimated under the 
assumption of a geometric depreciation pattern (with δ=0.91/T), against the series that would 
result from the assumption of a straight-line process. Gaps in the series are negligible, due to the 
similarity of these two depreciation patterns in the case of non-residential structures. The average 
difference is 1.4 percent and the maximum gap is only 2.9 percent. 
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Fig. 4.  The Spanish infrastructure stock: alternative estimates under different 
assumptions on the efficiency decay pattern
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To summarize, it may be useful to remember Charles Feinstein’s considerations on his own 
estimation of the British capital stock in the late nineteenth century. He suggested that a 10 
percent average margin of error might be assumed in his aggregate series. In the case of the 
sectoral estimates, this bias should be increased up to 25 percent.29 Given the differences 
between the UK and Spain as far as the quality of the available information is concerned, and 
given the outcomes of the different sensitivity analyses that have been carried out in this section, 
the infrastructure series that are presented here should be allowed, at least, the same margin of 
error as the British ones. In fact, it would be reasonable to assume larger biases in the five series 
for which information is scarcer and of poorer quality (non-public railroads, local roads, 
telegraph networks, gas distribution infrastructure and canals). It is necessary, therefore, to insist 
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that the figures that are reproduced in the Appendix must be considered carefully. As Feinstein 
himself stated, it is necessary to warn the researcher against the spurious air of precision 
conveyed by long runs of estimates systematically arrayed in neat tables.30 Keeping this caveat 
in mind, the next section describes the main features of the process of construction of Spanish 
infrastructure before the Civil War that may be inferred from the new series. 
 
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF SPANISH INFRASTRUCTURE BEFORE THE CIVIL 
WAR 
a. Infrastructure investment, 1845-1935 
As may be observed in Figure 1, Spanish investment in infrastructure showed an 
underlying positive growth trend, as well as very intense fluctuations throughout the period 
under study. A complete understanding of the dynamics of the series requires an analysis of any 
possible structural breaks that could have provoked a movement or alteration in the growth trend. 
For that purpose, the Vogelsang test has been applied to the series. This aims to contrast the 
existence of one-time breaks in time series in the presence of serial correlation, regardless of 
whether a unit root or a linear trend is present or not.31 I have applied the version of the test that 
was developed by Ben-David and Papell (2000) for finite series that are not I(1), because it 
allows testing for the presence of more than one break in the variables. The use of that version is 
justified in this case because, according to the ADF and the Phillips-Perron tests, the 
infrastructure investment series does not contain a unit root (see Table 2). 
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Table 2. Unit root tests. Gross Investment in infrastructure (1845-1935) 
ADF t-stat. -4.21** 
PP t-stat. -3.00* 
H0: Presence of a unit root. 
* Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5 percent significance level. 
** Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1 percent significance level. 
 
The presence of a structural break has been contrasted for all years between 1850 and 1930, 
after excluding the extreme points of the series according to the test specification. The test 
statistic for the rejection of the null hypothesis of no structural break reaches its maximum F-
statistic in 1854, at a level of 16.60, which is lower than the critical value of the test (17.85 at the 
5 percent significance level).32 Therefore, Spanish investment in infrastructure can be accepted to 
have followed a constant structural growth trend with no significant structural breaks during the 
country’s first long wave of industrialization. 
The lack of structural breaks is a common characteristic of most Spanish economic 
variables between the middle of the nineteenth century and the Civil War. In fact, the structural 
stability of investment in infrastructure reinforces the impression of continuity of that long 
historical period, in spite of the violent fluctuations that took place in the meantime.33 In the case 
of the new infrastructure series, neither the profound changes in its composition that are 
described below, nor the substantial cyclical instability that may be seen in Figure 1, were able to 
alter its structural growth trend. 
Table 3 presents the composition of infrastructure investment, and figures 5 and 6 show the 
percentage that gross investment in infrastructure accounted for within the GDP and total 
investment. This information provides a complete characterization of the process of 
infrastructure construction in Spain during the years under analysis. 
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Table 3. Spanish gross investment in infrastructure (1845-1935) 
A) Composition of investment (annual average, %) 
 Railroads Urban 
transport 
Roads Ports Telecom. Energy 
distrib. 
Hydr.  
Works 
Total 
 
1845/55 43.71 0.00 40.42 3.51 0.16 0.57 11.63 100 
1856/65 74.92 0.00 17.23 4.00 0.52 0.20 3.14 100 
1866/75 54.72 0.00 32.73 9.11 0.27 1.10 2.07 100 
1876/85 65.39 0.33 28.05 2.00 0.49 1.81 1.93 100 
1886/95 63.08 0.98 21.45 7.82 1.48 2.33 2.85 100 
1896/1905 44.49 7.27 21.09 15.26 0.54 5.86 5.49 100 
1906/15 31.67 3.73 21.46 16.90 2.12 14.45 9.66 100 
1916/25 21.05 11.70 18.54 7.17 3.52 29.64 8.38 100 
1926/35 15.88 4.56 30.92 8.74 9.53 18.38 12.00 100 
1845/1895 64.67 0.15 25.76 4.20 0.67 1.06 3.50 100 
1895/1935 28.57 5.90 24.05 10.50 5.09 16.85 9.02 100 
1845/1935 39.77 4.10 24.65 8.54 3.71 11.92 7.31 100 
 
B) Yearly growth rate of investment (%) 
 Railroads Urban 
transport 
Roads Ports Telecom. Energy 
distrib. 
Hydr.  
Works 
Total 
 
1845/1890 4.23  2.75 2.78  8.27 -1.31 3.33 
1890/1935 -1.64 5.20 3.59 1.12 8.46 8.00 6.17 3.36 
1845/1935 0.68  1.81 3.70  7.94 3.25 2.33 
Sources: see the Appendix. 
Note: Investment growth is expressed in annual accumulative rates, adjusted to a log trend. As a consequence, rates 
for the whole period are not the average of those for shorter periods. 
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Fig. 5.  Spanish Gross Infrastructure Investment/GDP (1850-1935)
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Fig. 6.  Spanish Gross Infrastructure Investment/Gross Total Investment
(1850-1935)
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The most striking feature of the graphs is the abnormally high investment rates of the years 
1855-1866, during which railroads were predominant within total investment. Those years 
correspond to the earliest and most intense Spanish railroad construction mania, which coincided 
in Spain with a substantial growth of the State’s capital formation in other infrastructure and, 
particularly, in the road network, ports and the telegraph system. The violence of the cycle of 
1855-1866 is illustrated by the fact that the maximum level of investment, which was reached in 
1862, was not regained in absolute terms until six decades later, and the maximum ratios 
between infrastructure investment and the GDP (3.9 percent), and between infrastructure 
investment and total investment (42.2 percent) were probably never reached again. Nevertheless, 
those percentages were not abnormal in the international context. Situations in which railroad 
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investment accounted for 3 percent or more of GDP and 30 percent or more of total investment 
may be found, for instance, in Britain in 1847, the US in 1854, Germany in the 1850s and the 
1860s, Hungary in the late 1860s and early 1870s, or Sweden in the 1870s.34 Railroad investment 
manias were a widespread phenomenon in the Western economies at the time, and the Spanish 
case fits perfectly with other such experiences.35 
The railroad mania ended in a deep investment crisis that started in 1866. Infrastructure 
construction resumed by the mid-1870s at much lower rates. Between 1875 and 1935, the 
average ratios between infrastructure investment and the GDP (1.2 percent) and total investment 
(15.8 percent), were similar or slightly lower than figures available for other economies during 
the period. For instance, investment in infrastructure was 2.7 percent of the GDP in Italy in 
1890-1935, 2.2 percent in the UK in 1830-1913, 2.0 percent in Germany in 1850-1913, 1.9 
percent in France in 1848-1913, and 1.2 percent in the Netherlands in 1800-1913.36 As for 
investment in infrastructure as a percentage of total investment, it was, for instance, 15.2 percent 
in Germany in 1850-1913, 14.4 percent in France in 1848-1913 and 22.1 percent in Italy in 
1890-1935.37 
Several periods may be distinguished in the evolution of investment in infrastructure 
between 1875 and the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. As may be observed in Table 3, the 
most important threshold is to be found around 1895. Before that year, the main feature of 
Spanish investment in infrastructure was the absolute prominence of railroads, since they 
absorbed nearly two thirds of the resources that were invested in the improvement and growth of 
Spanish infrastructure stock. By contrast, with the exception of the road network, investment in 
other types of infrastructure received extremely small proportions of the total resources. This 
situation gradually changed after the mid-1890s, when a process of intense diversification of 
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investment started. The reduction in the importance of railroads firstly benefited ports and urban 
and suburban transport, although the shares of those assets in total  investment were later taken 
over by irrigation infrastructure, the telephone system and, especially, energy distribution 
networks.38 
These changes in composition had a substantial impact on the fluctuations of investment in 
infrastructure. This impact has been analyzed by isolating the cyclical component of the series 
through the application of the Hodrick-Prescott Filter to its logarithm, and by comparing it with 
the cyclical component of Spanish GDP and industrial production during the period 1850-1935. 
Figures 7 and 8 show the 20-years moving correlation coefficients between the cyclical 
components of the two output variables and that of investment in infrastructure one year before, 
over the same year and one year later. 
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Fig. 7. Comovements of GDP and infrastructure investment (1850-1935)
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Fig. 8.  Comovements of industrial production and infrastructure investment
(1850-1935)
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According to the graphs, the association between the cyclical component of investment in 
infrastructure and production is always higher when the infrastructure variable is taken one year 
later than the output variable. The strong association between the main variables of the economy 
and gross investment in infrastructure in the following year indicates that fluctuations of the 
latter followed the movements of the rest of the economy with some time lag. Apparently, during 
the period of study, episodes of high economic growth fostered investment in infrastructure. This 
situation might have been the result of Wagner’s Law, i.e. the impact on infrastructure of the 
increase in the financial capacity of investors (and, especially, of the public sector) due to 
economic growth, and also might reflect reactions to the upsurge of bottlenecks, resulting as well 
from the growth of the economy. 
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The described relationship was especially intense from the 1890s onwards. By contrast, 
investment in infrastructure was much more independent of the fluctuations of the rest of the 
economy between the late 1870s and the early 1890s. This would be consistent with the extreme 
importance of railroad investment during those years. Unlike other sorts of infrastructure, 
railroads were large-scale projects of inter-regional scope and, therefore, their degree of 
accommodation to the short-term fluctuations of the economy was relatively low. The 
construction of railroads took a relatively long time, and the bottlenecks that they were intended 
to break up had a much more structural and long-term nature than in the case of other types of 
infrastructure. As a consequence, railroad construction cycles were to some extent self-sustained 
and did not adapt well to the global fluctuations of the economy. The peculiar behavior of 
railroad investment fluctuations has been pointed out for numerous countries, and has been 
explained on the basis of technology, but also because of political factors and the railroad 
companies’ strategic behavior within the railroad oligopoly.39 
By contrast, during the first third of the twentieth century, the change in the composition of 
investment in infrastructure and the decline in the importance of  the railroads meant a better 
adaptation of infrastructure capital formation to the immediate needs of the economy. After the 
mid 1890’s, the amounts involved in each project were much smaller, and the link between 
infrastructure assets and production activities was much closer than in the previous period. 
The diversification of investment from the 1890’s onwards was the consequence of several 
factors, such as: the virtual completion of the railroad network;40 the Spanish State’s growing 
economic activity as reflected in the increase of public work construction; and a number of 
technological changes, such as technical advances in the long distance transmission of electricity, 
or in telecommunications. In fact, the maximum development of these three aspects arrived in 
 30
the last investment cycle of the period under study, i.e. under Primo de Rivera’s Dictatorship and 
the Second Republic (1923-1936). During those years, diversification of investment reached its 
zenith, both in the case of public capital formation (with increasing resources devoted to roads, 
ports and hydraulic works) and private investment (in particular energy distribution, urban 
transport and telecommunications). The coincidence of the State’s activism with the dynamism 
of private investment resulted in very high percentages of the GDP being spent on infrastructure 
capital formation, up to a level of 2.5 percent in 1929. 
The exceedingly high volume of resources invested in infrastructure during the 1920’s may 
explain a unique feature of the cyclical behavior of gross investment in infrastructure during 
those decades. As may be seen in Figures 7 and 8, the correlation between production and lagged 
investment in infrastructure before the 1920’s was rarely significant, which might be interpreted 
as evidence of the minor influence of the elimination of bottlenecks by infrastructure, and of the 
irrelevance of its short-term “backward effects” on the evolution of the Spanish economy. 
However, during the 1920’s and 1930’s, fluctuations of infrastructure preceded fluctuations of 
industrial production. This change would be consistent with the considerations of some 
historians on the importance of public investment in the evolution of the Spanish industrial sector 
during those years. Jordi Palafox, for instance, has indicated that the military regime established 
in the country in 1923 was very sensitive to the interests of heavy industry, which had suffered 
an intense oligopolisation process in the previous period. As a consequence, during the 
dictatorship of 1923-1930, public investment in certain sorts of infrastructure (such as the 
railroad and road systems and hydraulic works) was four times as large as in the years between 
1917 and 1923, and became essential for the growth of the machinery, steel and concrete 
industries, for example. These would otherwise have stagnated during the period, since the deep 
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structural problems of the Spanish agrarian sector substantially reduced the growth prospects of 
domestic markets. 41 
b. The Spanish infrastructure stock 
As a consequence of the process of investment that has just been described, the Spanish 
endowment of infrastructure experienced a substantial growth during the period under analysis, 
which can be seen in Figure 2. The infrastructure stock grew at a yearly rate of 3.3 percent and, 
as a result, in 1935 it was 32 times larger than it had been in 1845. Figure 2 also shows that 
periods of intense growth of the stock, which were associated with episodes of high investment 
(such as the railroad mania of 1855-1866, or the 1920’s), alternated with long periods of slow 
growth. 
Table 4 shows the changes in the composition of Spanish infrastructure stock between 1845 
and 1935. These changes are the direct result of the evolution of investment. Concretely, they 
reflect the concentration of investment efforts in railroads and roads up to 1895. By contrast, 
after that year, and due to the diversification of investment in infrastructure, railroads gradually 
lost importance within the total stock, to the advantage of ports, energy distribution networks, 
hydraulic works, telecommunications and urban transport, which had absorbed negligible 
amounts of resources during the second half of the nineteenth century. 
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Table 4. Spanish net infrastructure stock (1845-1935) 
A) Composition of the stock (%) 
 Railroads Urban 
Transport 
Roads Ports Telecom. Energy 
Distribution 
Hydraulic 
Works 
Total  
 
1845 1.16 0.00 82.17 5.79 0.00 0.10 10.78 100 
1855 26.75 0.00 57.20 4.40 0.10 0.34 11.21 100 
1865 63.18 0.00 26.92 4.20 0.38 0.20 5.13 100 
1875 60.53 0.00 28.76 5.47 0.31 0.35 4.58 100 
1885 62.71 0.08 28.22 4.28 0.32 0.73 3.66 100 
1895 63.02 0.35 26.09 5.52 0.55 1.08 3.38 100 
1905 58.58 1.68 25.65 7.89 0.47 1.80 3.93 100 
1915 51.36 1.77 25.51 10.51 0.78 4.50 5.57 100 
1925 42.98 4.10 24.81 9.98 1.31 10.37 6.46 100 
1935 33.41 3.63 28.31 10.04 4.18 11.40 9.02 100 
 
B) Yearly growth rates of the stock (%) 
 Railways Urban 
Transport 
Roads Ports Telecom. Electricity Hydraulic  
Works 
Total  
1845/95 11.14  3.35 5.66  9.35 2.60 5.82 
1895/1935 0.37 7.91 1.81 3.38 6.80 8.67 3.97 1.87 
1845/1935 4.25  2.32 4.39  8.45 2.73 3.25 
Sources: see the Appendix. 
Note: Stock growth is expressed in annual accumulative rates, adjusted to a log trend. As a consequence, rates for 
the whole period are not the same as the average of those for shorter periods. 
 
Figure 9 shows the evolution of the ratio between infrastructure stock and the total Spanish 
capital stock during the period under study. It clearly shows the effects of the huge investment 
efforts of the years between 1855 and 1866, which increased the percentage from around 18 
percent to more than 25 percent. Later on, this percentage started to decrease, in a process that 
would continue until the Civil War. At the beginning, the reduction in the importance of 
infrastructure within the whole Spanish capital stock that took place after 1866, just reflected the 
return to normality after the excess investment of the railroad mania. However, once the stock 
reached the percentage level of the years before 1855 the decline did not stop. In fact, from the 
final years of the nineteenth century onwards, the reduction in the ratio seems to be a 
consequence of the diversification of the Spanish total investment and the increasing use of 
machinery and equipment in a growing number of sectors. 
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Fig. 9.  Spanish infrastructure stock/total capital stock (1850-1935)
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From a comparative point of view, the percentages that are reproduced in Figure 9 are 
similar to those of other economies during the period, such as Germany (between 1850 and 
1930) or Japan and the Soviet Union (in the Inter-war period), where they fluctuated between 14 
and 20 percent. By contrast, the Spanish percentages were lower than those of the UK (20-25 
percent) or Italy (26-29 percent) during the same period.42 
The relationship between infrastructure stock and GDP provides a first approximation to 
the relative abundance or shortage of infrastructure in Spain during the period under study. The 
evolution of this percentage is reported in Figure 10, which shows its gradual growth from levels 
of about 10 percent in the mid-nineteenth century to levels above 40 percent on the eve of the 
Civil War of 1936. However, this increase was not a steady one. As could be expected, growth 
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was steep during the years of the railroad mania, reaching levels close to 35 percent, but it was 
abruptly interrupted in 1866, and from this date to the mid-1890’s, percentages fluctuated 
between levels of 20 to 35 percent. Growth only resumed in the last decades of the period, and 
during the 1930’s the ratio reached levels of over 40 percent. 
Fig. 10.  Spanish net infrastructure stock/GDP (1850-1935)
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How do these percentages look in an international context? It is difficult to answer this 
question, since the comparison among historical infrastructure endowments of different countries 
is rather difficult. This is due to the extreme paucity of infrastructure stock estimates, and the fact 
that the available figures are hardly comparable because of differences in definitions and in 
estimation techniques. In this context, Table 5 is just a preliminary attempt to carry out that 
comparison for a few economies for which appropriate information is available. 
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Table 5. Net Infrastructure Stock/GDP in different countries (1850-1930, %) 
 1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 
Spain 10.33 18.65 34.07 24.75 26.61 38.31 36.06 33.68 37.80 
Netherlands 29.11 29.34 37.86 38.72 39.32 31.72 30.27 na na 
UK 43.50 44.90 46.30 47.94 49.33 46.74 48.21 44.89 38.93 
Japan na na na na 19.41 25.26 30.51 32.50 42.75 
Italy na na na na 71.63 74.68 72.21 64.40 65.55 
USSR na na na na Na na na na 17.15a 
US na na na na Na na na na 68.62b 
Sources: 
Spain: GDP from Prados de la Escosura (2003) and my own infrastructure stock figures. 
Netherlands: Groote (1996), Maddison (1995) and Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (1994). 
UK: Capital stock from Feinstein (1965), (1972) and (1988), and GDP from Deane (1968) and Maddison (1995). 
Japan: Capital stock from Ohkawa et al (1966) and GDP from Ohkawa et al (1974). 
Italy: Rossi et al (1993). 
US: Bureau of Economic Analysis, in http://www.bea.doc.gov. 
USSR: Moorsteen and Powell (1966, p. 50). 
Notes: na: not available; (a) in 1928; (b) in 1929. 
 
According to the table, the endowment of infrastructure in industrialized countries stood 
between 30 and 50 percent of GDP during the second half of the nineteenth century and the first 
decades of the twentieth century, although, in a few cases, such as Italy and the US, it might have 
reached even higher levels. In this context, the growth of the Spanish infrastructure as a 
percentage of GDP constituted a process of convergence with the situation in more advanced 
economies. However, that convergence process, as has been said, was not continuous, but 
experienced a one-time boost in 1855-1866 and, later on, a long stagnation until the last few 
years of the nineteenth century, when it gradually resumed. 
As a result of this convergence process, by the end of 1935 Spain had an infrastructure 
endowment that was acceptable from a comparative point of view, and had been obtained 
through several decades of substantial investment efforts. The country, however, still suffered 
from serious shortages in certain areas. For instance, it still lacked a national electricity network, 
suffered from a serious scarcity of secondary roads, and the density of its railroad network was 
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rather low in the European context.43 However, its endowment of social fixed capital was 
relatively acceptable in many other areas. Unfortunately, the Civil War and the post-war period 
introduced a violent break in the previous convergence trend, which would open up a huge gap 
between Spain and the advanced economies. Afterwards, several decades would again be 
necessary to reduce the distance. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper presents new estimates of Spanish infrastructure stock and investment for the 
period 1845-1935. The new series are intended to provide quantitative information about one of 
the key factors in Spanish economic growth during the first stages of industrialization. Although 
some measurement of State capital stock had already been undertaken by other scholars, this 
research is the first systematic attempt to estimate the value of the entire Spanish infrastructure. 
A variety of sources and techniques has been used in the estimation, and the new series may be 
accepted as reasonably reliable to the standards of historical statistics, with the possible 
exceptions of some minor infrastructure sectors, such as non-public railroads, the telegraph and 
gas distribution networks, the stock of Spanish canals and urban infrastructure. Thanks to the new 
series, a nearly complete picture of the process of development of Spanish infrastructure between 
the mid-nineteenth century and the present is available. 
The new quantitative evidence reflects a constant and sustained effort of improvement and 
enlargement of the Spanish infrastructure endowment throughout the 1845-1935 period. 
Although investment in infrastructure was characterized by intense fluctuations, especially 
during the early and final years of the period under study, it is not possible to confirm the 
presence of structural breaks in the series that could have interrupted or substantially altered its 
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long-term growth. Broadly speaking, two distinct periods may be distinguished in the evolution 
of Spanish infrastructure. On the one hand, the second half of the nineteenth century was 
characterized by the prominent role of railroads, which accounted for exceedingly high shares of 
total infrastructure investment. On the other hand, from the last few years of the nineteenth 
century onwards, railroad capital formation stagnated due to the virtual completion of the main 
network, and the majority of investment in infrastructure was then addressed to other assets such 
as roads, ports, electricity distribution and hydraulic works. 
The new series allow a very preliminary comparison of Spanish infrastructure endowment 
with that of other advanced economies of the time. Between the mid- nineteenth century and the 
eve of Spain’s Civil War, the ratio between Spanish infrastructure stock and the GDP undertook 
a substantial growth process, and converged with the levels experienced in other industrialized 
countries. That convergence, however, was highly concentrated in certain periods, such as the 
railroad mania of 1855-1866, and the Inter-war years. The next question to answer in this 
context, is to what extent the relative shortage of infrastructure during most of the period under 
study might have been one of the factors to blame for Spain’s  lack of convergence before the 
Civil War. Although this problem has been considered by historians for decades, the new series 
allow for a more systematic approach and for  the application of econometric techniques to 
address the issue. This task will indeed be undertaken in further research. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1. Spanish Gross Infrastructure Investment, 1845-1935 (millions of 1890 pesetas) 
 Broad
gauge 
railrd.
Narrow 
gauge 
railrd. 
Non-
public 
railrd. 
Tram-
ways 
Sub-
way 
State’s 
roads 
Prov. 
roads 
Local 
roads 
Ports Telegraph 
network 
Telephone 
network 
Gas 
distrib. 
network
Electric. 
distrib. 
network
Reservoirs Other 
hydr. 
works
TOTAL TOTAL 
corrected (inc. 
urban inf.) 
1845 1.41     2.40 0.33 0.07 0.40   0.10  0.60 1.06 6.37 6.47 
1846 1.95     2.40 0.33 0.07 0.34   0.09  0.11 1.06 6.35 6.43 
1847 3.12     3.17 0.39 0.09 0.36   0.07  0.11 1.06 8.37 8.44 
1848 4.92 0.25    5.13 0.55 0.12 0.44   0.06  0.15 1.06 12.68 12.74 
1849 7.57 0.57    7.69 0.76 0.17 0.56   0.01  0.29 3.13 20.74 20.74 
1850 10.36 0.64    9.46 0.90 0.20 0.75   0.07  0.29 3.13 25.79 25.86 
1851 12.73 0.65    11.86 1.09 0.24 0.85 0.08  0.13  0.22 3.13 30.98 31.11 
1852 14.11 0.67    14.13 1.28 0.28 1.10 0.08  0.20  0.22 3.13 35.21 35.40 
1853 14.85 0.41    11.93 1.09 0.24 1.54 0.08  0.21  0.22 3.13 33.71 33.91 
1854 16.68 0.09    9.80 0.93 0.20 1.22 0.08  0.23  0.40 3.13 32.78 33.00 
1855 18.72 0.03    12.75 1.16 0.26 1.27 0.08  0.25  0.40 3.13 38.06 38.30 
1856 19.96 0.01    9.35 0.99 0.21 2.12 0.77  0.23  0.40 3.17 37.22 37.44 
1857 32.68     11.31 1.02 0.23 1.27 1.08  0.23  0.40 5.52 53.73 53.95 
1858 48.99 0.04    14.25 1.06 0.26 1.63 1.09  0.19  0.40 5.52 73.44 73.62 
1859 87.88 0.38    8.70 1.10 0.30 2.42 0.46  0.29  0.05 2.64 104.21 104.49 
1860 113.53 0.69    13.43 1.14 0.21 2.80 0.31  0.28  0.05 2.64 135.06 135.33 
1861 131.05 0.69    26.53 1.18 0.21 3.73 0.46  0.21  0.05 2.92 167.02 167.22 
1862 133.48 0.69    27.93 1.23 0.22 4.66 0.59  0.13  0.05 2.92 171.90 172.02 
1863 118.79 0.96    24.07 2.82 0.22 9.70 0.58  0.14  0.05 2.92 160.24 160.37 
1864 97.30 1.33    23.02 3.08 0.23 9.74 0.39  0.27  0.05 2.92 138.32 138.58 
1865 60.72 1.42    17.70 3.38 0.24 7.36 0.17  0.25  0.05 2.92 94.18 94.42 
1866 30.01 1.45    11.57 3.70 0.26 4.87 0.01  0.29  0.05 2.88 55.08 55.36 
1867 13.84 1.49    12.27 1.84 0.23 2.98 0.04  0.21  0.05 0.53 33.49 33.69 
1868 5.97 1.19    14.92 1.92 0.24 3.47 0.06  0.31  0.05 0.53 28.66 28.95 
1869 9.11 1.20    11.35 1.99 0.25 2.42 0.14  0.32  0.05 0.53 27.37 27.68 
1870 9.57 1.80    8.15 0.42 0.25 1.73 0.11  0.33  0.05 0.53 22.96 23.27 
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Table A1. Spanish Gross Infrastructure Investment, 1845-1935 (millions of 1890 pesetas) (continued) 
 Broad
gauge 
railrd.
Narrow 
gauge 
railrd. 
Non-
public 
railrd. 
Tram-
ways 
Sub-
way 
State’s 
roads 
Prov. 
roads 
Local 
roads 
Ports Telegraph 
network 
Telephone 
network 
Gas 
distrib. 
network
Electric. 
distrib. 
network
Reservoirs Other 
hydr. 
works
TOTAL TOTAL 
corrected (inc. 
urban inf.) 
1871 10.59 2.06    10.23 0.42 0.26 3.29 0.10  0.52  0.05 0.26 27.79 28.29 
1872 11.40 2.13 0.12   9.37 0.42 0.27 3.58 0.02  0.59  0.05 0.26 28.23 28.79 
1873 20.58 2.68 0.24   7.78 2.66 0.33 1.13 0.01  0.54  0.19 0.26 36.40 36.91 
1874 33.72 2.60 0.36   5.52 2.80 0.34 5.39 0.15  0.43  0.27 0.26 51.83 52.24 
1875 37.04 1.78 0.47   7.40 2.94 0.35 4.64 0.33  0.52  0.47 0.26 56.21 56.71 
1876 29.14 1.50 0.24   11.66 3.10 0.36 0.60 0.72  0.91  0.47 0.26 48.96 49.83 
1877 25.20 1.73 0.01   13.60 3.26 0.37 0.64 0.67  1.35  0.47 0.26 47.56 48.85 
1878 50.53 1.51 0.09   14.47 3.44 0.39 0.64 0.51  1.15  0.61 0.26 73.61 74.70 
1879 61.97 1.73 0.28   17.05 3.62 0.40 0.81 0.23  0.83 0.70 0.68 0.26 88.55 89.34 
1880 69.70 2.84 0.27   14.80 3.81 0.41 1.20 0.16  0.36 0.76 0.87 0.26 95.46 95.80 
1881 57.48 3.84 0.09 0.36  16.69 4.01 0.43 1.06 0.24  0.76 0.83 0.87 0.82 87.48 88.20 
1882 58.66 5.32 0.14 1.12  33.09 4.83 0.28 0.89 0.25  1.20 0.20 0.87 0.82 107.67 108.82 
1883 51.65 6.67 0.28 0.36  19.09 3.47 0.02 1.14 0.29  1.48 0.21 0.62 0.82 86.10 87.51 
1884 39.24 6.74 0.15 0.76  19.30 2.52 0.22 2.74 0.33  1.62 0.23 0.46 2.62 76.93 78.47 
1885 30.59 6.32 0.05 0.03  17.20 7.95 0.64 6.01 0.37 0.05 1.40 0.25 0.10 2.72 73.69 75.02 
1886 23.89 6.77 0.41 0.14  21.29 6.87 1.40 3.47 1.75 0.05 0.97 0.27 0.11 2.89 70.26 71.19 
1887 25.27 7.23 0.76 0.16  25.28 2.07 0.26 4.18 2.04 0.21 1.15 0.30 0.18 2.81 71.91 73.01 
1888 30.88 8.53 0.60 0.27  23.21 0.13 0.03 4.02 2.00 0.26 1.91 0.32 0.19 2.95 75.31 77.12 
1889 39.97 11.52 0.61 0.39  19.28 0.13 0.03 3.73 0.83 0.21 1.99 0.35 0.19 2.85 82.09 83.98 
1890 49.83 13.99 0.89 0.76  17.32 0.13 0.03 4.43 1.04 0.09 1.57 0.35 0.22 2.60 93.25 94.75 
1891 64.76 15.87 1.08 2.38  15.43 4.19 0.43 13.64 1.15 0.07 1.36 0.52 0.25 2.05 123.18 124.48 
1892 69.07 15.97 1.27 2.74  15.03 4.35 0.44 10.94 1.25 0.40 1.63 0.61 0.33 1.76 125.78 127.33 
1893 65.25 13.62 1.49 0.32  15.96 1.13 0.72 9.54 0.91 0.33 1.63 1.24 0.36 1.91 114.42 115.97 
1894 68.92 10.35 1.76 0.50  14.88 1.14 0.75 10.61 0.75 0.35 0.91 2.00 0.39 2.47 115.79 116.27 
1895 59.14 7.82 2.07 1.97  17.13 1.16 0.50 12.26 0.36 0.44 0.98 2.87 0.37 3.08 110.15 112.02 
1896 44.59 5.58 2.44 2.97  18.71 1.17 0.51 12.26 0.12 0.07 1.24 3.18 0.40 3.19 96.42 99.25 
1897 16.47 4.41 2.28 4.11  18.39 0.60 0.06 16.01 0.09 0.08 1.30 2.99 0.25 3.25 70.29 74.20 
1898 19.41 5.04 1.46 2.27  14.72 0.60 0.06 14.25 0.11 0.12 0.84 2.65 0.18 2.66 64.37 66.53 
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Table A1. Gross Infrastructure Investment, 1845-1935 (millions of 1890 pesetas) (continued) 
 Broad
gauge 
railrd.
Narrow 
gauge 
railrd. 
Non-
public 
railrd. 
Tram-
ways 
Sub-
way 
State’s 
roads 
Prov. 
roads 
Local 
roads 
Ports Telegraph 
network 
Telephone 
network 
Gas 
distrib. 
network
Electric. 
distrib. 
network
Reservoirs Other 
hydr. 
works
TOTAL TOTAL 
corrected (inc. 
urban inf.) 
1899 25.01 7.54 1.10 2.65  12.98 2.52 0.06 11.00 0.24 0.16 0.43 2.86 0.23 1.64 68.42 70.95 
1900 25.99 11.99 1.26 7.72  9.21 2.57 0.06 9.33 0.21 0.25 0.52 4.49 0.34 2.81 76.75 84.09 
1901 23.18 14.89 1.33 18.11  9.09 2.62 0.35 8.88 0.23 0.17 0.91 4.31 0.41 2.96 87.44 104.69 
1902 23.65 15.27 1.33 6.86  13.04 2.67 0.36 10.30 0.13 0.20 1.35 3.14 0.44 4.47 83.21 89.75 
1903 23.42 15.02 1.33 3.76  14.82 2.72 0.73 9.89 0.09 0.20 1.33 1.72 0.56 4.69 80.29 83.87 
1904 14.70 12.89 1.33 2.45  10.06 2.78 0.75 11.69 0.22 0.41 1.73 3.68 1.00 5.77 69.47 71.81 
1905 8.94 8.36 1.33 4.91  16.12 2.83 0.78 13.53 0.42 0.66 1.28 5.04 1.06 5.82 71.11 75.79 
1906 6.92 5.38 1.39 3.46  12.16 2.89 0.81 16.39 0.87 0.52 1.96 4.83 1.64 4.54 63.78 67.07 
1907 9.30 6.29 1.52 6.82  14.14 2.95 0.84 17.96 0.78 0.77 2.20 3.64 2.67 3.33 73.21 79.70 
1908 14.00 7.42 1.66 8.71  15.32 3.00 0.76 20.67 0.77 1.00 2.81 3.16 2.86 3.80 85.95 94.25 
1909 20.58 7.29 1.79 1.51  18.01 3.06 0.79 18.16 1.02 1.03 2.49 7.40 3.65 4.28 91.06 92.50 
1910 22.81 11.43 1.53 2.51  21.21 0.92 0.81 16.26 0.98 1.04 1.75 6.95 3.54 3.58 95.33 97.72 
1911 26.11 14.63 0.84 2.31  20.65 0.93 0.84 16.23 1.06 1.36 0.97 8.26 4.20 3.30 101.68 103.88 
1912 36.13 12.61 0.49 4.61  20.12 0.63 0.87 16.95 0.64 2.01 1.31 5.43 5.42 6.72 113.93 118.32 
1913 30.02 10.92 0.50 0.74  21.78 0.63 0.90 14.08 0.94 1.24 2.19 24.47 6.40 7.94 122.76 123.46 
1914 27.63 9.88 0.50 1.72  21.09 0.63 0.93 15.75 0.89 1.32 2.98 25.71 5.72 7.41 122.16 123.79 
1915 11.08 7.76 0.45 3.97  19.97 0.64 0.96 12.42 0.87 1.61 2.57 29.84 6.07 7.17 105.37 109.15 
1916 21.54 5.61 0.33 11.84  19.45 0.64 0.99 7.83 2.08 4.37 2.23 25.63 5.85 5.39 113.77 125.05 
1917 20.50 5.49 0.27 5.93 2.70 16.26 1.78 4.02 7.96 2.33 2.80 1.78 30.06 4.49 2.74 109.12 117.34 
1918 2.47 6.38 0.27 1.71 5.41 11.46 4.39 1.83 6.97 2.33 3.16 1.63 26.81 5.60 0.76 81.17 87.95 
1919 0.88 7.34 0.27 1.48 4.06 11.80 1.47 2.36 8.48 1.20 3.34 0.91 25.71 5.44 5.01 79.74 85.02 
1920 2.04 9.42 0.27 3.79 2.72 13.84 1.48 2.51 8.93 1.57 1.38 0.98 28.12 6.27 5.49 88.79 94.99 
1921 20.31 8.89 0.20 10.41 3.08 16.70 1.49 2.68 10.45 1.78 0.99 1.24 36.18 6.32 8.29 129.00 141.85 
1922 27.63 6.51 0.12 12.91 8.40 19.59 1.50 2.85 9.67 1.87 1.37 1.30 39.64 7.46 4.35 145.18 165.48 
1923 31.69 6.85 0.10 10.94 14.55 21.91 1.51 3.04 10.96 1.30 1.47 0.84 45.27 7.21 2.88 160.51 184.78 
1924 37.52 7.45 0.15 8.00 13.64 19.36 1.53 3.24 11.35 0.96 0.97 0.43 48.73 13.02 0.91 167.28 187.89 
1925 39.47 6.75 0.20 23.77 8.61 43.37 5.99 4.89 11.72 0.36 10.71 0.52 71.97 10.85 1.85 241.04 271.88 
1926 43.80 4.87 0.10 19.27 2.84 84.47 6.19 5.34 9.70 0.12 20.54 0.91 70.54 11.83 3.60 284.13 305.18 
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Table A1. Spanish Gross Infrastructure Investment, 1845-1935 (millions of 1890 pesetas) (continued) 
 Broad
gauge 
railrd.
Narrow 
gauge 
railrd. 
Non-
public 
railrd. 
Tram-
ways 
Sub-
way 
State’s 
roads 
Prov. 
roads 
Local 
roads 
Ports Telegraph 
network 
Telephone 
network 
Gas 
distrib. 
network
Electric. 
distrib. 
network
Reservoirs Other 
hydr. 
works
TOTAL TOTAL 
corrected (inc. 
urban inf.) 
1927 52.55 8.18 0.01 11.30 2.41 76.78 6.46 5.85 28.26 0.24 18.72 1.35 67.19 12.83 4.84 296.97 310.02 
1928 62.32 6.74 0.04 6.60 4.82 75.66 6.83 6.42 28.33 0.36 11.46 1.33 62.70 14.63 6.11 294.34 305.21 
1929 57.69 1.24 0.12 2.76 2.41 74.65 7.26 7.06 30.25 0.64 73.77 2.06 51.81 15.23 6.61 333.54 338.46 
1930 50.24 2.02 0.12 6.36 2.97 79.52 7.63 7.73 8.69 0.47 39.56 2.61 47.55 16.63 13.12 285.22 294.10 
1931 38.03 2.38 0.04 5.63 6.48 72.82 8.06 8.48 8.23 0.41 50.14 4.24 12.73 15.80 16.52 249.99 261.53 
1932 30.52 2.51 0.06 8.56 4.30 41.84 1.60 9.96 8.84 0.19 6.11 4.61 21.11 13.29 10.25 163.73 175.98 
1933 18.52 2.44 0.12 11.78 1.06 47.53 16.45 9.49 30.45 0.18 1.70 4.60 31.49 11.13 36.06 222.99 235.21 
1934 8.77 2.17 0.06 9.89 1.36 43.78 0.93 8.31 38.21 0.41 5.04 3.83 41.78 9.89 42.09 216.53 227.25 
1935 4.71 1.56 0.02 2.51 2.20 44.36 2.76 8.71 30.27 0.66 10.44 2.32 30.63 6.92 36.34 184.42 188.91 
Note: as is indicated in the text, for broad gauge railroads, State’s roads and ports, investment figures have been estimated directly from information on capital 
formation flows. In all other cases, they have been calculated on the basis of gross stock estimates (see the estimation method in Section II above). The price index that has 
been used to deflate the available investment series (in the cases of broad gauge railroads, State’s roads and ports), or to express in 1890 pesetas the stock and investment 
indices estimated on the basis of physical indicators (in all other cases) is the deflator for “Other construction” investment, which has recently been estimated by Leandro 
Prados de la Escosura (2003). 
Sources:  
a) For broad gauge railroads, the main source of information is a sample of capital accounts of railroad companies. Investment data has been collected for Compañía de 
Caminos de Hierro del Norte de España, from Tedde (1978, pp. 264-290); Compañía de los Ferrocarriles de Madrid a Zaragoza y a Alicante (MZA), from the 
company’s yearly accounts; most broad gauge Catalan companies (before their absorption by MZA), from Pascual (1999); Compañía del Ferrocarril de Tudela a Bilbao, 
from Ormaechea (1989, p. 18); and Compañía de los Ferrocarriles Andaluces, Compañía de los Caminos de Hierro del Sur de España and Compañía de los 
Ferrocarriles de Madrid a Cáceres y Portugal (y del Oeste de España), from the companies’ yearly accounts and Ortúñez (1999). The share of land and rolling stock 
within investment has been calculated from information in MZA’s yearly accounts, Alzola (1884/1885, 33, p. 228), Hernández (1983), Tedde (1978, pp. 264-290), and 
Pascual (1999). The average unit cost coming from this sample of companies (which accounted for more than 80 percent of the broad gauge network during most of the 
period under study) has been applied to the rest of the network, whose mileage has been taken from Spain, Ministerio de Fomento, Memoria(s), Anuario(s) and 
Estadística(s) de Obras Públicas (1860-1924) and Wais (1987). 
b) For narrow gauge railroads, average unit cost per km of electrified and non-electrified line has been estimated on the basis of a large sample of companies’ capital 
accounts in 1922 (corresponding to 89% of the network), which is available in Spain, Ministerio de Fomento, Estadística de Obras Públicas (1922). The share of land 
and rolling stock within investment has been estimated on the basis of Alzola (1884/1885). Unit cost figures have been applied to each year (electrified and non-
electrified) mileage, which has been estimated from Spain, Ministerio de Fomento, Memoria(s), Anuario(s) and Estadística(s) de Obras Públicas (1860-1924), Anuario 
de Ferrocarriles de D. Enrique de la Torre (1922-1935), and Olaizola (2003, pp. 16-18). 
c) For non-public railroads, yearly mileage in operation has been estimated on the basis of Spain, Ministerio de Fomento, Memoria(s), Anuario(s) and Estadística(s) de 
Obras Públicas (1874-1924) and Anuario de Ferrocarriles de D. Enrique de la Torre (1922-1935), and average unit cost has been taken from Alzola (1884/1885, 33, p. 
228). 
d) For tramways, average unit cost per km of horse, steam and electricity-drawn lines has been estimated on the basis of a large sample companies’ capital accounts in 
1907, which is available in Spain, Ministerio de Fomento, Estadística de Obras Públicas (1907). The share of rolling stock has been taken from Gil Carretero (1968, p. 
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462). Unit cost figures have been applied to the yearly mileage of each type of traction, which has been estimated from Spain, Ministerio de Fomento, Memoria(s), 
Anuario(s) and Estadística(s) de Obras Públicas (1882-1924), Anuario de Ferrocarriles de D. Enrique de la Torre (1893-1935), and Ceballos (1932, vol. 7, p. 381). 
e) For the subway, average unit cost per km of line comes from Gómez-Santos (1969, p. 40), and has been applied to each year’s mileage, which comes from RENFE 
(1958, p. 122), and Comín et al. (1998, vol. 2, p. 307). 
f) For State’s roads, the investment series is based on the State’s expenditure on the road network from 1859 onwards, which is available in Uriol (1968). Before 1859, the 
average construction cost, coming from Uriol (1968), p. 414, has been applied to each year’s network mileage, which has been estimated from Uriol (1992, pp. 15-16, 25 
and 67). 
g) For provincial roads, the average construction cost has been estimated on the basis of information on bids for road construction at the expense of the provincial 
institutions in 1896-1899, which comes from the Revista de Obras Públicas (various years). The resulting figure has been applied to each year’s network mileage, which 
comes from Spain, Ministerio de Fomento, Memoria(s), Anuario(s) and Estadística(s) de Obras Públicas (1862-1924), and Anuario Estadístico de España (1931-1935). 
h) For local roads, the average construction cost has been estimated on the basis of information on the State’s expenses in local roads in 1911-1924, which has been taken 
from Gómez Mendoza (1991, p. 192). The resulting figure has been applied to each year network mileage, which comes from Spain, Ministerio de Fomento, Memoria(s), 
Anuario(s) and Estadística(s) de Obras Públicas (1866-1924) and Anuario Estadístico de España (1931-1935). 
i) For ports, the basis of the investment series until 1908 is the series of port construction expenditure that is provided by Cercos (1968). For the period 1908-1935, a 
comparison of the physical characteristics of the Spanish ports in 1908, 1925 and 1965, taken from Spain, Ministerio de Fomento, Estadística de Obras Públicas (1908), 
Junta Central de Puertos (n.d., pp. 204-213), and Cercos (1968, p. 624), has been complemented with information on the evolution of  total  port expenditure of the port 
Juntas in 1908-1925, taken from Junta Central de Puertos (n.d., pp. 214-222), and the amounts allocated to port investment in the State’s budget in 1925-1965, coming 
from Suárez de Tangil (1954, pp. 50-51), and Cercos (1968, p. 605). 
j) For the telegraph system, the value of the network in 1896 has been estimated on the basis of its physical description, which comes from the Estadística Telegráfica de 
España (1896) and the unit cost of each of its components, which has been taken from De Urquijo (1968, p. 694), and López Hernández (1968). The resulting gross 
value has been brought backward and forward according to the network mileage, which comes from the Estadística Telegráfica de España (1864-1934). 
k) For the telephone system from 1924 onwards, data on the nearly monopolistic Compañía Telefónica Nacional de España’s assets, has been taken from its yearly 
accounts, and this has been applied unit value figures coming from López Hernández (1968). For small companies, information has been taken from the Estadística 
Telegráfica de España (1924-1934), the yearly accounts of the company Red Provincial de Guipúzcoa and Echaide (1929). Before 1924, the value of the gross stock in 
that year has been brought backward according to the evolution of the number of networks and their subscribers, coming from the Estadística Telegráfica de España 
(1885-1924). 
l) For the gas distribution network, the gross value of the stock in 1900 has been estimated from information about the companies’ capital accounts in Costa (1981, pp. 49-
57), and brought forward and backward according to the evolution of production, which comes from Carreras (1983, vol. 1, pp. 72-73). 
m) For the electricity distribution network, the gross value of the stock in 1943 has been estimated from the information on the companies’ capital accounts that is provided 
in Becerril (1946), and brought forward and backward according to the evolution of production, which comes from Bartolomé (1999). 
n) For hydraulic works, the construction cost of each individual reservoir has been estimated from information in Garrido (1968). For other hydraulic infrastructure after 
1883, the value of the State’s investment in hydraulic works (net of the value of State reservoirs) has been used as a lower bound of total investment. This information is 
available in Mas et al. (1995, vol. 4). Before 1883, the State’s role in the construction of hydraulic works was marginal and a valuation of those canals for which data are 
available has been used as a lower bound of the gross stock. Information about individual canals has been obtained from Spain, Ministerio de Fomento, Memoria(s), 
Anuario(s) and Estadística(s) de Obras Públicas (1862-1924), Bello (1914), Alzola (1979), Ceballos (1932) and Fernández Ordóñez (1986). 
o) No systematic information is available on urban infrastructure. The last column of the table is just a preliminary correction of the sum of all other infrastructure, in an 
attempt to reduce the potential bias associated with the exclusion of urban infrastructure from the series. A lower bound of the bias in 1900-1905 has been calculated 
from information on local public works in Núñez (1996, p. 400), and carried forward and backward according to the evolution of urban transport investment (between 
1894 and 1935) and investment in gas distribution infrastructure (between 1845 and 1894). 
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Table A2. Spanish Net Infrastructure Stock, 1844-1935 (millions of 1890 pesetas) 
 Broad
gauge 
railrd.
Narrow 
gauge 
railrd. 
Non-
public 
railrd. 
Tram-
ways 
Sub-
way 
State’s 
roads 
Prov. 
roads 
Local 
roads 
Ports Telegraph 
network 
Telephone 
network 
Gas 
distrib. 
network
Electric. 
distrib. 
network
Reservoirs Other 
hydr. 
works
TOTAL TOTAL 
corrected (inc. 
urban inf.) 
1844 0.81     147.51 7.10 1.56 10.80   0.09  2.41 16.72 187.00 187.00 
1845 2.21     147.12 7.29 1.60 10.99   0.19  2.97 17.50 189.86 189.96 
1846 4.11     146.73 7.48 1.64 11.12   0.27  3.03 18.26 192.65 192.83 
1847 7.16     147.11 7.74 1.70 11.28   0.33  3.08 19.02 197.41 197.65 
1848 11.94 0.25    149.44 8.14 1.79 11.50   0.38  3.19 19.77 206.41 206.69 
1849 19.28 0.82    154.32 8.75 1.92 11.85   0.36  3.42 22.59 223.31 223.58 
1850 29.27 1.44    160.90 9.50 2.08 12.38   0.42  3.65 25.38 245.02 245.35 
1851 41.44 2.07    169.80 10.43 2.29 13.00 0.08  0.53  3.81 28.13 271.60 272.04 
1852 54.77 2.69    180.89 11.53 2.53 13.88 0.16  0.72  3.98 30.86 302.00 302.61 
1853 68.58 3.05    189.64 12.44 2.73 15.17 0.23  0.90  4.14 33.55 330.44 331.24 
1854 83.98 3.09    196.16 13.18 2.89 16.14 0.30  1.10  4.48 36.21 357.53 358.52 
1855 101.14 3.06    205.56 14.14 3.10 17.14 0.38  1.31  4.81 38.85 389.48 390.68 
1856 119.23 3.02    211.45 14.91 3.26 18.98 1.14  1.50  5.14 41.48 420.11 421.48 
1857 149.71 2.96    219.24 15.71 3.44 19.95 2.18  1.67  5.47 46.43 466.77 468.30 
1858 195.95 2.95    229.87 16.54 3.65 21.28 3.20  1.80  5.79 51.33 532.36 534.02 
1859 280.21 3.28    234.83 17.40 3.90 23.37 3.56  2.03  5.76 53.30 627.63 629.51 
1860 388.54 3.92    244.47 18.29 4.05 25.82 3.76  2.23  5.72 55.25 752.03 754.10 
1861 512.37 4.54    267.09 19.21 4.20 29.17 4.10  2.36  5.68 57.45 906.16 908.36 
1862 636.24 5.15    290.86 20.16 4.36 33.42 4.57  2.41  5.64 59.62 1,062.42 1,064.67 
1863 743.10 6.02    310.50 22.69 4.52 42.66 5.01  2.45  5.61 61.76 1,204.33 1,206.62 
1864 826.52 7.24    328.87 25.47 4.69 51.83 5.25  2.64  5.57 63.89 1,321.95 1,324.42 
1865 871.82 8.53    341.71 28.50 4.86 58.51 5.26  2.79  5.53 65.99 1,393.49 1,396.11 
1866 885.57 9.81    348.27 31.82 5.05 62.64 5.10  2.98  5.50 68.03 1,424.76 1,427.56 
1867 882.86 11.07    355.46 33.24 5.21 64.82 4.99  3.08  5.46 67.70 1,433.89 1,436.79 
1868 872.28 12.00    365.22 34.73 5.38 67.47 4.90  3.28  5.43 67.37 1,438.05 1,441.13 
1869 865.01 12.92    371.30 36.27 5.55 69.04 4.89  3.44  5.40 67.05 1,440.89 1,444.17 
1870 858.42 14.43    327.50 71.48 5.73 69.91 4.85  3.61  5.37 66.73 1,428.04 1,431.48 
1871 853.09 16.19    332.41 71.44 5.92 72.32 4.81  3.97  5.35 66.14 1,431.63 1,435.41 
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Table A2. Spanish Net Infrastructure Stock, 1844-1935 (millions of 1890 pesetas) (continued) 
 Broad
gauge 
railrd.
Narrow 
gauge 
railrd. 
Non-
public 
railrd. 
Tram-
ways 
Sub-
way 
State’s 
roads 
Prov. 
roads 
Local 
roads 
Ports Telegraph 
network 
Telephone 
network 
Gas 
distrib. 
network
Electric. 
distrib. 
network
Reservoirs Other 
hydr. 
works
TOTAL TOTAL 
corrected (inc. 
urban inf.) 
1872 848.66 18.03 0.12   330.17 80.64 6.10 75.00 4.69  4.39  5.32 65.56 1,438.68 1,442.86 
1873 855.11 20.41 0.30   332.63 91.95 6.35 75.20 4.56  4.74  5.43 64.99 1,461.67 1,466.18 
1874 875.02 22.69 0.61   333.22 94.26 6.60 79.65 4.57  5.00  5.62 64.42 1,491.64 1,496.40 
1875 897.22 24.14 1.02   335.38 96.01 6.87 83.30 4.76  5.31  6.00 63.86 1,523.87 1,528.92 
1876 911.29 25.31 1.35   343.45 97.64 7.14 82.87 5.34  5.98  6.38 63.31 1,550.05 1,555.75 
1877 919.44 26.68 1.43   350.23 101.37 7.42 82.49 5.85  7.03  6.75 62.76 1,571.46 1,578.16 
1878 954.43 27.83 1.47   358.63 104.87 7.71 82.10 6.18  7.85  7.27 62.22 1,620.56 1,628.04 
1879 1,001.46 29.23 1.65   369.51 108.36 8.01 81.90 6.22  8.30 0.70 7.85 61.68 1,684.86 1,692.76 
1880 1,057.59 31.73 1.90   384.92 105.28 8.32 82.09 6.20  8.25 1.44 8.62 61.15 1,757.48 1,765.34 
1881 1,103.03 35.19 2.04 0.36  397.55 104.85 8.64 82.14 6.22  8.62 2.21 9.37 61.19 1,821.42 1,829.63 
1882 1,150.45 40.09 2.13 1.46  438.94 92.47 8.81 82.01 6.25  9.42 2.33 10.12 61.22 1,905.71 1,914.68 
1883 1,192.30 46.33 2.32 1.77  458.83 86.67 8.72 82.13 6.32  10.49 2.46 10.61 61.25 1,970.20 1,980.19 
1884 1,221.25 52.59 2.50 2.46  480.16 77.94 8.83 83.85 6.42  11.61 2.60 10.94 63.09 2,024.24 2,035.30 
1885 1,240.29 58.39 2.56 1.65  493.88 82.19 9.36 88.82 6.56 0.05 12.48 2.76 10.90 65.00 2,074.88 2,086.76 
1886 1,251.98 64.64 2.79 1.72  508.50 87.24 10.64 91.20 7.80 0.09 12.91 2.93 10.86 67.05 2,120.37 2,132.67 
1887 1,264.17 71.29 3.36 1.83  527.21 87.81 10.77 94.27 9.19 0.30 13.54 3.12 10.90 69.01 2,166.76 2,179.65 
1888 1,282.35 79.13 3.99 2.03  542.98 87.16 10.66 97.13 10.47 0.55 14.90 3.33 10.95 71.09 2,216.71 2,230.89 
1889 1,309.59 89.95 4.54 2.35  555.51 86.30 10.56 99.67 10.81 0.75 16.23 3.56 11.00 73.04 2,273.87 2,289.33 
1890 1,341.31 102.65 5.25 3.02  566.41 85.02 10.46 102.88 11.40 0.82 17.12 3.78 11.07 74.72 2,335.91 2,352.21 
1891 1,387.59 117.05 6.18 5.29  576.54 86.92 10.75 115.27 12.02 0.86 17.75 4.16 11.18 75.83 2,427.41 2,444.31 
1892 1,437.61 131.36 7.29 7.84  585.63 89.23 11.06 124.82 12.67 1.23 18.64 4.62 11.37 76.64 2,519.99 2,537.74 
1893 1,483.18 143.11 8.59 7.87  595.90 89.32 11.64 132.86 12.97 1.52 19.47 5.69 11.58 77.58 2,601.28 2,619.82 
1894 1,531.85 151.44 10.13 8.09  605.11 89.06 12.24 141.87 13.17 1.83 19.54 7.49 11.82 79.08 2,682.73 2,700.95 
1895 1,570.14 157.12 11.94 9.75  618.57 88.79 12.59 152.44 13.07 2.22 19.67 10.08 12.04 81.17 2,759.59 2,778.90 
1896 1,593.43 160.49 14.07 12.36  632.49 89.39 12.95 162.89 12.79 2.22 19.99 12.89 12.28 83.35 2,821.58 2,842.82 
1897 1,588.37 162.66 16.24 15.43  645.77 88.94 12.85 176.97 12.48 2.23 20.32 15.42 12.37 85.56 2,855.59 2,879.74 
1898 1,586.41 165.44 17.85 16.87  654.29 88.49 12.75 189.13 12.18 2.28 20.21 17.51 12.39 87.15 2,882.94 2,908.17 
1899 1,590.18 170.69 18.87 18.64  661.67 89.97 12.66 197.90 12.00 2.38 19.73 19.73 12.46 87.71 2,914.58 2,941.26 
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Table A2. Spanish Net Infrastructure Stock, 1844-1935 (millions of 1890 pesetas) (continued) 
 Broad
gauge 
railrd.
Narrow 
gauge 
railrd. 
Non-
public 
railrd. 
Tram-
ways 
Sub-
way 
State’s 
roads 
Prov. 
roads 
Local 
roads 
Ports Telegraph 
network 
Telephone 
network 
Gas 
distrib. 
network
Electric. 
distrib. 
network
Reservoirs Other 
hydr. 
works
TOTAL TOTAL 
corrected (inc. 
urban inf.) 
1900 1,594.97 180.33 19.82 25.41  664.87 91.48 12.56 204.89 11.80 2.55 19.33 23.50 12.64 89.44 2,953.60 2,986.45 
1901 1,596.97 192.74 20.87 42.00  665.54 93.02 12.76 211.36 11.63 2.64 19.18 26.96 12.88 91.29 2,999.85 3,048.41 
1902 1,597.77 205.14 21.94 47.34  670.14 94.60 12.96 219.17 11.40 2.76 19.30 29.12 13.16 94.63 3,039.42 3,092.23 
1903 1,597.45 217.07 22.99 49.37  676.46 96.82 13.53 226.49 11.13 2.88 19.47 29.78 13.55 98.16 3,075.14 3,129.17 
1904 1,587.16 226.71 24.03 50.03  679.60 96.07 14.12 235.52 10.96 3.20 20.16 32.08 14.38 102.72 3,096.73 3,150.83 
1905 1,570.99 231.78 25.06 52.48  687.72 97.75 14.73 246.29 10.92 3.76 20.57 35.63 15.26 107.29 3,120.22 3,176.88 
1906 1,553.46 233.84 26.11 53.45  691.96 99.47 15.36 259.80 11.17 4.17 21.48 39.08 16.71 110.52 3,136.57 3,194.18 
1907 1,538.11 236.73 27.24 57.29  698.14 101.23 16.02 274.72 11.34 4.81 22.42 41.22 19.17 112.50 3,160.95 3,222.50 
1908 1,524.36 240.75 28.49 63.46  705.07 103.03 16.59 292.19 11.57 5.67 23.82 42.78 21.80 114.94 3,194.50 3,261.55 
1909 1,516.06 244.57 29.87 62.36  714.61 104.87 17.18 306.94 12.15 6.53 24.80 48.53 25.17 117.82 3,231.44 3,296.88 
1910 1,509.39 252.38 31.13 62.48  726.63 104.55 17.78 319.62 12.69 7.37 25.10 53.61 28.41 119.97 3,271.11 3,336.03 
1911 1,507.82 263.15 31.87 62.43  737.96 104.23 18.41 332.13 13.27 8.51 24.77 59.80 32.27 121.81 3,318.43 3,382.82 
1912 1,516.74 271.57 32.11 64.36  749.90 103.62 19.05 345.22 13.40 10.26 24.72 62.92 37.31 127.05 3,378.25 3,444.25 
1913 1,521.10 278.05 32.19 62.65  763.36 103.02 19.72 355.29 13.82 11.19 25.26 84.96 43.27 133.46 3,447.34 3,510.93 
1914 1,525.12 283.40 32.29 61.84  775.95 102.43 20.41 366.91 14.16 12.17 26.54 107.45 48.48 139.26 3,516.42 3,578.57 
1915 1,513.82 286.61 32.35 63.24  787.28 101.85 21.12 375.08 14.45 13.39 27.51 133.17 53.97 144.75 3,568.61 3,631.69 
1916 1,514.05 287.59 32.31 71.22  797.96 101.27 21.86 378.56 15.40 17.34 28.20 153.71 59.20 148.40 3,627.08 3,698.63 
1917 1,513.03 288.39 32.20 73.40 2.70 807.77 101.85 25.62 382.13 16.46 19.54 28.31 177.68 63.00 149.37 3,681.44 3,757.99 
1918 1,493.50 289.93 32.06 72.29 8.09 812.96 105.03 27.14 384.67 17.50 22.00 28.27 197.23 67.86 148.34 3,706.85 3,786.78 
1919 1,472.00 292.11 31.92 70.92 12.08 815.94 105.25 29.17 388.69 17.83 24.59 27.79 214.62 72.52 151.57 3,726.99 3,809.11 
1920 1,451.25 296.18 31.79 71.35 14.68 820.93 105.48 31.34 393.11 18.45 25.19 27.36 233.67 77.94 155.24 3,753.96 3,838.54 
1921 1,447.87 299.46 31.62 77.86 17.63 828.73 105.71 33.65 399.01 19.20 25.39 27.12 260.16 83.36 160.70 3,817.46 3,910.70 
1922 1,451.53 300.30 31.35 86.17 25.87 839.33 105.96 36.11 404.05 20.00 25.83 26.91 289.28 89.85 162.80 3,895.34 4,003.93 
1923 1,459.67 301.70 31.01 92.03 40.18 852.12 106.21 38.72 410.34 20.33 26.39 26.44 322.88 96.02 163.41 3,987.45 4,115.51 
1924 1,473.25 303.99 30.68 95.52 53.46 862.24 106.53 41.51 416.94 20.37 26.42 25.74 358.08 103.49 162.04 4,080.28 4,223.28 
1925 1,489.61 305.78 30.39 112.61 61.58 896.64 111.18 45.90 423.75 19.44 36.15 25.11 415.31 112.92 161.63 4,248.01 4,413.74 
1926 1,511.55 305.87 30.13 120.62 63.86 970.77 115.98 50.69 428.50 18.92 55.57 24.75 469.49 123.42 162.97 4,453.07 4,627.00 
1927 1,544.77 309.37 29.81 124.76 65.69 1,036.36 120.96 55.92 451.74 18.55 72.57 24.67 518.91 134.81 165.53 4,674.40 4,852.47 
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Table A2. Spanish Net Infrastructure Stock, 1844-1935 (millions of 1890 pesetas) (continued) 
 Broad
gauge 
railrd.
Narrow 
gauge 
railrd. 
Non-
public 
railrd. 
Tram-
ways 
Sub-
way 
State’s 
roads 
Prov. 
roads 
Local 
roads 
Ports Telegraph 
network 
Telephone 
network 
Gas 
distrib. 
network
Electric. 
distrib. 
network
Reservoirs Other 
hydr. 
works
TOTAL TOTAL 
corrected (inc. 
urban inf.) 
1928 1,587.01 311.24 29.43 125.29 69.91 1,099.80 126.19 61.66 474.75 18.31 81.79 24.57 561.26 147.84 169.33 4,888.39 5,069.42 
1929 1,623.49 305.14 29.09 120.90 71.68 1,160.75 131.71 67.95 499.38 18.30 153.01 25.06 590.64 161.28 172.76 5,131.13 5,309.57 
1930 1,651.93 301.57 28.79 120.91 74.00 1,224.86 137.48 74.83 502.09 18.13 187.83 26.25 614.78 175.96 182.66 5,322.08 5,501.06 
1931 1,667.86 298.06 28.50 120.41 79.80 1,280.85 143.54 82.37 504.27 17.90 232.20 28.76 603.69 189.67 195.85 5,473.73 5,656.43 
1932 1,675.83 294.63 28.17 121.57 83.38 1,303.64 143.00 91.27 506.93 17.50 231.19 31.45 601.57 200.71 202.61 5,533.46 5,719.18 
1933 1,671.39 291.27 27.85 125.48 83.68 1,332.28 157.38 99.63 531.00 17.11 225.79 33.79 608.24 209.46 235.11 5,649.46 5,837.36 
1934 1,657.93 284.99 27.57 129.39 84.29 1,356.28 156.15 106.72 562.68 16.92 223.82 35.41 625.12 216.81 273.27 5,757.36 5,948.57 
1935 1,641.25 281.42 27.27 126.20 85.72 1,381.63 156.67 114.11 586.04 16.90 227.21 35.75 629.73 221.11 305.25 5,836.24 6,024.04 
Sources: The stock figures are the result of applying the perpetual inventory method to the investment figures in Table A1. The value of the net stock at the end of 1844 in the 
cases of roads, ports and hydraulic works has been estimated on the basis of Uriol (1992), Spain, Ministerio de Fomento, Memoria(s), Anuario(s) and Estadística(s) de Obras 
Públicas (1862-1924), Bello (1914), Alzola (1979), Ceballos (1932), Fernández Ordóñez (1986) and Cunningham (1914). 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                          
1 The only serious attempt to endow the country with an extensive network of highways and 
canals took place in the last half of the 18th century. However, by 1840 the projected radial 
highway system was still incomplete and none of the critical junction of the projected canals had 
been finished. On this subject, see Ringrose (1970, pp. 14-17) and also Madrazo (1984, pp. 162-
167). 
2 See, for example, Diamond and Spence (1989); Batten and Karlsson (1996); Holtz-Eakin and 
Lovely (1996); and Fujita et al. (2000). 
3 According to Maddison’s international database, the Spanish GDP per capita was around 60 per 
cent of the average income per capita of the UK, France and Germany, both by 1850 and by 
1929; see Maddison (1995). Recently, Prados de la Escosura has offered an image of the Spanish 
relative income per capita which is slightly different than Maddison’s, showing a slow long-term 
decline from a higher starting point; see Prados de la Escosura (2003, pp. 179-181). On the high 
degree of uncertainty regarding the level of Spanish income per capita in the mid- nineteenth 
century, see Reis (2000). Nevertheless, this author’s recent alternative estimate for 1850 would 
not change the picture that is offered by Maddison’s data very much. 
4 See the classical works by Tortella (1972, pp 118-121) and Nadal (1976, pp. 551-553) and 
recent research by Comín et al. (1998, vol. 1, pp. 140-141). 
5 See, especially, Gómez Mendoza (1983). 
6 See, for instance, the proceedings of the three Conferences on Spanish Railroad History that 
have taken place in the last few years (Alicante, 1998, Aranjuez, 2001 and Gijón, 2003). A 
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survey of the research that was carried out on the Spanish railway system up to 1998 can be seen 
in Gómez Mendoza (1998). 
7 The main references are shortly surveyed in Herranz-Loncán (2002), Chapter 1. 
8 See, for instance, Groote (1996, pp. 22-26). As a consequence of these definition problems, 
some authors renounce to define infrastructure, and describe it as, “what most people consider it 
to be”; Button (1996, p. 148). Definition problems are probably associated with the fact that 
infrastructure does not correspond to any of the usual national account categories; within the UN 
System of National Accounts, the closest category would be “Other buildings and structures”, 
but this also includes buildings devoted to industrial and commercial uses, which cannot be 
considered as infrastructure; see United Nations (1993). 
9 Hirschman (1958, p. 83); Stern (1991, p. 128). 
10 Diewert (1986, pp. 3-4).  
11 See a discussion on this issue in Button (1996, p. 148-151). 
12 See, for instance, Batten (1990, p. 88). 
13 See, for example, Hansen (1965, pp. 7-12) or Aschauer (1989, pp. 193-194) and, for the 
Spanish case during the last few decades, Mas et al. (1996, p. 647). 
14 Hulten and Schwab (1993, pp. 271-272); Gramlich (1994, p. 1177). 
15 Mas et al. (1998). 
16 Mas et al. (1995, vol. 4). 
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17 Cucarella (1999). 
18 The process of estimation of gross investment figures on the basis of physical indicators is 
described by Ohkawa et al (1966, p. 135), and Groote (1996, p. 95). A similar procedure for 
machinery is applied by De Long and Summers (1994, pp. 13-14). The definition of “new” 
investment that is reproduced in the text comes from Feinstein and Pollard (1988, p. 2). 
19 The data sources can also be seen in the Appendix. Actually, in a lot of cases data search was 
facilitated to a great extent by the pioneering research efforts carried out by Gómez Mendoza in 
the field of transport and communications; see Gómez Mendoza (1989b). 
20 Prados de la Escosura (2003). 
21 Escribá-Pérez and Ruiz-Tamarit (1995). Actually, as has been stressed by Hulten (1990, p. 
127), a more rigorous analysis of the capital stock should consider the coefficients φ of efficiency 
decay as endogenous. 
22 See, for instance, Madrazo (1984, p. 235), or Gómez Mendoza (1989a, p. 35). 
23 Hulten (1990, pp. 124-125 and 142). 
24 The IVIE estimates are available in Mas et al. (1998). They include the following 
infrastructure: railroads, roads and highways, ports, airports, hydraulic works and urban 
infrastructure. Their coverage is therefore different from my figures, which also include energy 
distribution networks and telecommunications, but exclude airports. The IVIE figures have been 
expressed in pesetas of 1890 by applying Prados de la Escosura’s deflator for “Other 
construction” investment, which has been taken from Prados de la Escosura (2003). 
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25 The importance of the periods 1855-1866 and 1922-1929 was already stressed, from the 
viewpoint of total capital formation, by Carreras (1990, pp. 124-126). 
26 Yearly figures of State non-military investment in air transport since the beginning of the 
twentieth century are available in Mas et al. (1995). However, two reasons prevent us from using 
this data to estimate infrastructure stock figures. Firstly, a large share of the Spanish airport 
investment was not financed by the State before 1936. And, secondly, the available data includes 
investment in land, which accounted for a very large share of total airport investment during the 
first stages of the history of air transport, and must not be included in infrastructure. On these 
issues, see AENA (1996). Nevertheless, the exclusion of those assets from the series is not very 
important. For instance, for the sake of illustration, if the value of the State-owned airport assets 
(including land) between 1928 and 1935 is calculated, it amounts to just 0.15 percent of the total 
infrastructure stock. 
27 As has already been indicated, the deflator that has been used in all cases is the series that was 
recently estimated by Prados de la Escosura (2003) for investment in “Other construction”. 
28 For instance, it has been used to obtain Spanish capital stock estimates by Cubel and Palafox 
(1997) and Prados de la Escosura and Rosés (2003). 
29 Feinstein (1988, p. 264). Similar margins of error are assumed by Groote in his estimation of 
the Dutch infrastructure stock between 1800 and 1913; see Groote (1996, p. 49). 
30 Ibidem. 
31 Vogelsang (1997). 
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32 The absence of a structural break around 1854 may be surprising, given the intensity of the 
fluctuations of the railroad era, which are dealt with in more detail below. However, if Figure 1 
is examined, the overall long term structural trend of investment does not seem to have been 
altered by the railroad mania. Nevertheless, the proximity of the starting point of the series 
prevents from drawing a final conclusion on this issue. 
33 Cubel and Palafox (1998) have searched for the presence of structural breaks before 1936 in 
the series of Spanish GDP, industrial production and investment, with no positive results. Pons 
and Tirado (2001) have analyzed Spanish GDP and GDP per capita in 1870-1994, and the 
earliest structural break they have found is in 1935, which is obviously associated with the 
impact of the Civil War. Finally, the lack of structural breaks in the series of Spanish GDP and 
GDP per capita before 1936 has recently been confirmed by Prados de la Escosura (2003, pp. 
145-146). 
34 For the UK and the US, see Mitchell (1964), Feinstein (1972, p. 40), and O’Brien (1977, p. 
55); for Germany, Fremdling (1983, p. 124), and Tilly (1978, p. 414); for Hungary, Katus (1983, 
p. 191); for Sweden, Hedin (1967, p. 11), and Holgersson and Nicander (1968, p. 5). 
35 See, for instance, Fishlow (1965, pp. 105-106), or O’Brien (1977, p. 57). 
36 Groote (1996, pp. 76 and 85), except for the Italian figure, which has been calculated on the 
basis of Rossi et al. (1993). 
37 These percentages have been calculated from Hoffman (1965), Lévy-Leboyer and 
Bourguignon (1990) and Rossi et al. (1993). 
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38 Actually, production and distribution of electricity constituted the most important destination 
of capital in Spain during the first third of the twentieth century, and the paid-up capital of the 
electricity companies reached the same level as the capital of the railroad companies by 1921; 
see Bartolomé (1995, p. 109). 
39 On the independent character of railroad investment fluctuations see, for Britain, Kenwood 
(1965, pp. 314-319), and Hawke (1970, pp. 363-379), for the US, Fishlow (1965, p. 179), for 
France, Caron (1983, p. 35), for Sweden, Hedin (1967, pp. 10-11), and, for Hungary, Katus 
(1983, p. 191). The role of political factors on this independent behavior has been stressed by 
Fenoaltea (1983, pp. 53-54), and Lévy-Leboyer (1978, pp. 249-250), and the importance of the 
railroad companies’ strategic behavior within the railroad oligopoly, has been highlighted by 
Harley (1982, p. 797). 
40 In 1895, 86 percent of the pre-Civil War length of the main (broad gauge) railroad network 
had already been open to public service. 
41 Palafox (1980, pp. 23-33); see also Palafox (1991). However, unlike this author, Comín and 
Martín Aceña (1984, pp. 249-258), have pointed out that the small size of the public sector 
during the 1920’s and 1930’s prevented it from being decisive in the evolution of the Spanish 
industry. 
42 These percentages have been calculated from the following sources: for Germany, Hoffmann 
(1965), for Japan, Ohkawa et al. (1966), for the Soviet Union, Moorsten and Powell (1966, p. 
50), for the UK, Feinstein (1965), (1972) and (1988), and, for Italy, Rossi et al. (1993). The 
German percentage refers to capital figures in gross terms. 
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43 Herranz-Loncán (2002), Ch. 4 and, on the absence of a national electricity distribution 
network, Bartolomé (2003). 
